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The title of this article, although based upon the common
railroad crossing sign, seems equally applicable to litigation practice where so much of pretrial strategy amounts to deciding
whether to ride the daunting maze of intersecting procedural
tracks which may lead to trial on the merits. Recently, the New
Jersey Legislature created the Frivolous Lawsuit Statute (Statute),' a powerful new vehicle available to litigants and their attorneys who believe that claims or defenses asserted against them
are frivolous. With the enactment of the Statute, the warning at
the crossings of our state system must be changed to that which
the federal system under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
(Rule 11) has posted since 1984: "Stop, Think, Investigate and
Research." 2 Perhaps the fifth admonition should be, "and
Defend."
This article will discuss selected defenses to a motion under
the Statute in a format which will hopefully aid the litigator in
both anticipating the defenses when bringing such a motion and
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I N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1 (West Supp. 1989). The Statute was approved
on June 28, 1988 and became effective 180 days after enactment.
2 Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1987); Lieb v. Topstone
Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986).
3 Under the holding in Evans v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins., 233 N.J.
Super. 652, 664, 559 A.2d 888, 894 (Law Div. 1989), the claim must be made by
motion. The court stressed that a motion, in contrast to a counterclaim or cross-
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amine the case law pertaining to Rule 11. The lower courts will
undoubtedly rely on this extensive body of case law as a guide to
interpreting the Statute, which in language and purpose largely
mirrors its federal analogue. This may not only provide courts
with a fact-oriented guide to the Statute's application, but may
also reveal weaknesses in the statutory scheme. Such weaknesses
were acknowledged in a recent report by the Third Circuit Task
Force on Rule 11 (Third Circuit Task Force).'
I.

BACKGROUND

Similar to Rule 11, but with notable differences, the Statute
allows a court to award reasonable litigation costs and attorney
fees to a prevailing party in a civil action if it finds that the losing
party asserted a frivolous claim or defense. Earlier drafts of the
Statute contained a $2500 cap on an award of attorney fees and
did not include litigation costs as a basis for compensation.
Those limitations were deleted in the final text however, creating
a more potent weapon. The final version of the Statute provides:
a. A party who prevails in a civil action, either as plaintiff or
defendant, against any other party may be awarded all reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees, if the
judge finds at any time during the proceedings or upon
judgment that a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense of the nonprevailing person was frivolous.
b. In order to find that a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim
or defense of the nonprevailing party was frivolous, the
judge shall find on the basis of the pleadings, discovery, or
the evidence presented that either:
(1) The complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense
was commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely
for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury; or
(2) The nonprevailing party knew, or should have known
that the complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense was without any reasonable basis in law or equity
claim, "avoids confusion, by separating its procedures from those implicated by the
issues of trial." Id.
4 Rule 11 in Transition The Report q/ the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of
Procedure 11, Am.JUDICATURE Soc'r 41-42 (S. Burbank reporter 1989) [hereinafter
Report].
- See GOVERNOR'S STATEMENT to A.1086, A.2029. A.783 & A.1260, 202nd Leg.,
2d Sess. (1987) (discussing the governor's support but dissatisfaction with the provision of the Statute limiting an award to an unreasonably low $2500). See also
Schroth, Frivolous Suit Bill is a Serious Possibilitv, 121 NJ.L.J. 877, 894 (May 5, 1988)
(discussing the governor's conditional veto of the $2500 cap).
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and could not be supported by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law.
c. A party seeking an award under this section shall make application to the court which heard the matter. The application shall be supported by an affidavit stating in detail:
(1) The nature of the services rendered, the responsibility
assumed, the results obtained, the amount of time
spent by the attorney, any particular novelty or difficulty, the time spent and services rendered by secretaries and staff, other factors pertinent in the evaluation of
the services rendered, the amount of the allowance applied for, an itemization of the disbursements for which
reimbursement is sought, and any other factors relevant
in evaluating fees and costs; and
(2) How much has been paid to the attorney and what provision, if any, has 6been made for the payment of these
fees in the future.
Prior to enactment of the Statute, redress for abuses by a party
or attorney in the course of litigation was available under the court
rules, the ethics rules, and the common law. There is nothing in the
plain language of the Statute which would curtail any of those
rights. It is interesting that although there are so many theories on
which to base sanctions or damages for frivolous litigation, the legislature nevertheless felt compelled to create the Statute. Perhaps
even more significantly, the appellate division of the superior court
as recently as 1984 invited the NewJersey Supreme Court to amend
the court rules in that regard.7
There are a wide variety of New Jersey court rules which provide for sanctions in response to abuses by litigants or their attorneys in the course of litigation.' The availability of such sanctions
6 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1 (West Supp. 1989). According to the American
Tort Reform Association, similar statutes exist in Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia and Wyoming. Schroth,
supra note 5, at 894.
7 Berthelsen v. Hall, 194 N.J. Super. 22, 26-27, 475 A.2d 1275, 1277-78 (App.
Div. 1984). The court in Berthe/.en determined that New Jersey Court Rule 1:4-8
limited sanctions for filing a frivolous suit to disciplinary actions or contempt proceedings but emphasized that rule 1:4-8 should be amended to allow for the "imposition of sanctions upon an attorney or pro se litigant fo- vexatious litigation . ... "
Id. at 26, 475 A.2d at 1278. The court thus reversed the imposition of a $250
sanction against the plaintiff's attorney for bringing an action without adequate
legal basis. Id. at 27, 475 A.2d at 1278.
8 See, e.g., PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES R. 1:2-4 (sanctions for failure
to appear at court proceeding); N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8 (effect of signature of attorney or
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"assures predictability and promotes the expeditious disposition of
litigation." 9 However, such harsh sanctions as the dismissal of a
party's cause of action or suppression of a party's answer and defenses are drastic measures and should not "be invoked except in
those cases where the order for discovery goes to the very foundation of the cause of action .. .or where the refusal to comply is

deliberate and contumacious .... .'"1 Accordingly, courts favor the
imposition of lesser sanctions, such as the award of attorney fees
and costs, so as not to prejudice clients for what is often the delinquency of their attorneys. The courts are, therefore, mindful that
"justice is the polestar and our procedures must ever be moulded
and applied with that in mind."'
There is a long line of cases in which courts have considered
sanctioning litigants or their attorneys who have in one way or another abused the litigation process.' 2 Particularly instructive was
party on pleadings and motions); N.J. CT.R. 1:9-1 (sanctions for failure to respond
to a notice in lieu of a subpoena); N.J. CT.R. 2:9-9 ("[flailure properly to prosecute
or defend an appeal or proceedings for certification"); N.J. CT. R. 2:11-4(c) (attorney fees "[a]s a sanction for violation by the opposing party of the rules for prosecution of appeals"); N.J. CT. R. 4:20-7 (attorney fees as a sanction for failure to
comply with an order directing a medical examination); N.J. CT. R. 4:23-1 (attorney
fees as a sanction for abuses of discovery procedure in the Law or Chancery Divisions of the Superior Court); N.J. CT. R. 4:46-6 (factual contentions raised in bad
faith in response to a summary judgment motion may result in an assessment of
counsel fees); N.J. CT. R. 6:4-6 (sanctions for abuses of discovery procedure).
9 Jansson v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J. Super. 190, 194, 486 A.2d 920,
922 (App. Div. 1985).
10 Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., Respiratory Disease Assoc., 199 N.J. Super.
114, 119, 488 A.2d 1029, 1031-32 (App. Div. 1985) (quoting Lang v. Morgan's
Home Equip. Corp., 6 N.J. 333, 339, 78 A.2d 705, 708 (1951)).
It Id. at 120, 488 A.2d at 1032 (quoting N.J. Highway Auth. v. Renner, 18 N.J.
485, 495, 114 A.2d 555, 560 (1955)).
12 See, e.g., Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 253, 440 A.2d 1329, 1332-33 (1982)
(dismissal with prejudice is the ultimate sanction when a part' fails to comply with
discovery rules, but that sanction should be applied sparingly); Mauro v.OwensCorning Fiberglas, 225 N.J. Super. 196, 206, 542 A.2d 16, 21 (App. Div.), ceitif
granted, cross petition for certif denied, 113 N.J. 341, 550 A.2d 455 (1988) (trial judge
has wide discretion in deciding appropriate sanction for a breach of discovery, but
the sanction must be just and reasonable); McCalla v. Harnischfeger Corp., 215
N.J. Super. 160, 171, 521 A.2d 851, 857 (App. Div.), certif denied, 108 N.J. 219, 528
A.2d 37 (1987) (trial court erred in limiting defendant's expert testimony in response to breach of discovery rules); Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., Respiratory
Disease Assoc., 199 N.J. Super. 114, 119-21, 488 A.2d 1029, 1031-32 (App. Div.
1985) (where trial judge dismissed complaint for failure to comply with discovery
rules, appellate division remanded for a determination whether a lesser sanction
than dismissal would suffice to erase the prejudice suffered by the non-delinquent
party); Calabrese v.Trenton State College, 162 N.J. Super. 145, 151, 392 A.2d 600,
603 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 82 N.J. 321, 413 A.2d 315 (1980) (plaintiff barred from
introducing expert testimony for failure to provide expert reports); Burke v. Cen-
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the court's imposition of attorney fees against the pro se plaintiff in
Atkinson v. Pittsgrove Township. '3
In Atkinson, the pro se plaintiff proceeded against the same
party, based on identical facts, demanding essentially the same relief
on four separate occasions. Finding that under such circumstances
the suit was "clearly frivolous," the chancery division imposed a
$500 penalty sanction.' 4 The court reasoned that, although New
Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9, which allows counsel fees under certain
enumerated circumstances, 15 was inapplicable in the case of frivolous litigation, the court had the inherent power to relax the strictures of the court rules in order "to seek simplicity and provide
fairness in administration and the elimination of unjust expense and
delay."' '
The Atkinson court stressed that "[t]he court ha[d] the inherent
power to protect itself and litigants against harassment and vexatious litigation and an abuse of process."'" Significantly, the court
completed its analysis by suggesting that the supreme court promulgate a rule to allow for counsel fees in this type of case.' 8
The next year in Berthelsen v. Hall, 9 the appellate division distinguished the holding in Atkinson, concluding that it could not be
applied to impose sanctions against attorneys." In Berthelsen, the
trial judge determined that the attorney had instituted an action
tral R.R., 42 N.J. Super. 387, 395, 126 A.2d 903, 907 (App. Div. 1956) (plaintiff
required to pay defendant's expenses up to dismissal).
13 193 N.J. Super. 23, 471 A.2d 1215 (Ch. Div. 1983).
14 Id. at 25, 33, 471 A.2d at 1216, 1220. The court also noted that it would
impose increased penalties in the event that similar misconduct occurred. Id. at 33,
471 A.2d at 1220.
15 NewJersey Court Rule 4:42-9 provides that counsel fees may be paid out of a
fund in court and are allowed in family and probate actions, actions for the foreclosure of mortgages, actions to foreclose on tax certificates, actions upon the liability
or indemnity policy of insurance, and in all cases where permitted by statute
whether or not there exists a fund in court. N.J. CT. R. 4:42-9.
16 Atkinson, 193 N.J. Super. at 31-32, 471 A.2d at 1218-19. The court determined that its inherent power stemmed, inter alia, from NewJersey Court Rule 1:12. Id.
17 Id. at 32, 471 A.2d at 1219 (citing Masholie v. River Edge, 135 N.J. Eq. 193,
199, 37 A.2d 861, 864 (Ch. Div. 1944), aft'd, 136 N.J. Eq. 118, 40 A.2d 627 (E. & A.
1945)).
18 Id., 471 A.2d at 1219. The court noted that such a rule is not a prerequisite
for the allowance of counsel fees. Id.
19 194 N.J. Super. 22, 475 A.2d 1275 (App. Div. 1984).
20 Id. at 23-24, 475 A.2d at 1276-77. The Berthelsen court noted that the sanction
in Atkinson had been imposed upon a pro se plaintiff. Id. While the chancery court
in Atkinson had the inherent power to impose a penalty against the plaintiff, the
Berthelsen court recognized that the court rules limit similar sanctions against attorneys. Id. at 24, 475 A.2d at 1276-77.
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without just cause and awarded a $250 penalty. The appellate division reversed holding that since the disciplinary rules preclude an
attorney from instituting a frivolous lawsuit, 2' referral to the appropriate ethics committee, instead of the imposition of counsel fees
and costs, was the appropriate response.2 2 Just as in Atkinson, the
court advocated an expansion of the court rule concerning attorney
fees so as to cover a situation involving frivolous litigation. The
court noted, however, that until it is expanded, New Jersey Court
Rule 1:4-8 acts as a limitation on judicial action.
Of course, a key distinction between referral to the ethics committee and bringing a claim under the Statute is that the former
21 Id. at 25-26, 475 A.2d at 1277-78. DR 7-102, now superseded by RPC 3.1,
provided:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit,
assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he believes that such action would
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another. (2) Knowingly
advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law,
except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law.
N.J. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102. RPC 3.1 provides in part:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, nor assert or controvert an issue therein unless the lawyer knows or reasonably believes that
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1. See also In re Hecker, 109 N.J. 539,
548-49, 538 A.2d 354, 358-59 (1988) (DR 1-102(A)(l), (5), and (6), superseded by
RPC 8.4(b) and (d), which concerned "conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice and adversely reflecting on fitness to practice," is applicable to the institution of frivolous litigation by an attorney).
22 This raises the problematic issue of whether an attorney may defend a client
against a claim under the Statute when one of the issues is whether the attorney or
client should bear the culpability for the interposition of the frivolous claim or defense. RPC 1.7(b) prohibits an attorney from representing a client "if the representation of that client may be materially limited by [t]he lawyer's own interests." N.J.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b). While the rule allows the client to
consent after full disclosure, "in certain cases [consent to continued representation is immaterial." N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)(2), (c)(1).
In its recent report, the Third Circuit Task Force cogently argued that this is
another reason that there should be a "presumption that, if' sanctions are to be
imposed, they will be imposed on the lawyer, leaving re-allocation between lawyer
and client (if permitted) to private ordering." Report, supra note 4, at 41. See also
Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule I l-a Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181,
199 (1985) (noting problem this raises with respect to attorney-client privilege).
The court in Evans v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins., 233 N.J. Super.
652, 559 A.2d 888 (Law Div. 1989), spoke favorably of the presumption that the
attorney should be assessed because, "it may lead to greater fulfillment of the policy underlying the statute to assess those fees and costs against the nonprevailing
person's attorney where it is the attorney, not the party, who controls the tactical
positions asserted in the answer." Id. at 665 n.3, 559 A.2d at 894 n.3.
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does not provide damages to the party who was the target of the
frivolous claim or defense. Furthermore, the Rules of Professional
Conduct are binding only upon the attorney, not a party who may
have misled his attorney regarding certain facts of the case.
New Jersey Court Rule 1:4-8 provides that the signature of an
attorney or a party pro se on a pleading constitutes a certification by
the signer "that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief
there is good ground to support it; that it does not contain scandal23
ous or indecent matter; and that it is not interposed for delay."
Nonetheless, under the Atkinson and Berthelsen holdings, violating
NewJersey Court Rule 1:4-8 is not sufficient, in the absence of other
authority, to provide for an award of attorney fees in response to
frivolous litigation. As pointed out in Evans v. PrudentialProperty and
Casualty Insurance,24 the first case to apply it, the Statute provides the
authority to award attorney fees.
Evans illustrated that the common law causes of action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process are more limited in scope
than the Statute. Although those causes of action apply to the party,
23 N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988) (attorney who multiplies
proceedings unreasonably is liable for personal excess costs, expenses and attorney
fees).
24 233 N.J. Super. 652, 559 A.2d 888 (Law Div. 1989). In Evans, an insurer was
sued by his insured for failure to properly investigate and adjust-the insured's fire
loss. Id. at 654-55, 559 A.2d at 889-90. The insurer defended on the basis that it
had paid the appraisal award, which was binding under the terms of the insurance
policy, and therefore, the insured was precluded from bringing the suit. Id. at 655,
559 A.2d at 890.
Consequently, the insurance company counterclaimed for "reimbursement of
all fees and costs associated with the defense of this matter, and punitive damages
as the court may deem just" based upon the plaintiffs having filed the complaint
"for the improper purpose of extracting additional funds." Id. Plaintiffs moved to
dismiss under New Jersey Court Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Id. at 654, 559 A.2d at 889. Defendants argued that
their counterclaim had indeed stated a cause of action, a cause of action under the
Frivolous Lawsuit Statute. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1 (West Supp.
1989)).
The court held that the defendants could not have stated a valid claim under
the Statute because such a claim could only be brought by motion, not counterclaim. Id. at 664, 559 A.2d at 894. Further, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion
under the Statute holding that at this early stage in the litigation it could not "find
that the counterclaim was asserted in bad faith since it was not advanced solely for

the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury ....

[Nor could it] find that

defendant knew or should have known that the counterclaim had no legal or equitable basis." Id. at 666, 559 A.2d at 895. The court cautioned, however, that it had
"not adjudicated the factual or legal merits of the counterclaim." Id. Rather,
"[o]nce an adjudication of the causes of action in the complaint is made, defendant
may properly apply to the court for an award under the Statute." Id. at 666 n.4,
559 A.2d at 895 n.4 (emphasis in original).
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they each contain elements of proof which require more than the
mere filing of a frivolous claim or defense.
The elements of malicious prosecution are: "(1) the suit was
brought without probable cause, (2) it was actuated by malice, (3) it
has been terminated favorably to plaintiff, and (4) plaintiff suffered a
special grievance." 2'1 5 Although these elements are analogous in one
degree or another to the requirements of the Statute, the Evans
court concluded that "[w]hile there are similarities, the distinctions
are vividly significant." ' 26 For example, a successful malicious prosecution claim demands both malicious motive and lack of probable
cause, while the Statute requires only "either malevolence or lack of
legal or equitable justification ..... 27
The tort of abuse of process also contains elements of proof
which fall far beyond that necessary under the Statute. Such a cause
of action requires "some further act after the issuance of process
representing the perversion of the legitimate use of the process. "128
Clearly, the mere filing of a claim or defense, however frivolous, will
not necessarily involve the improper use of court process required
for this tort. The fact that the elements of both torts are so difficult
to prove is no coincidence. There is strong public policy in New
Jersey that nothing should inhibit people from seeking judicial
redress.
Thus, the Statute fills in the gaps left by the court rules concerning sanctions. Further, the Statute is more expansive than the
narrowly construed torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of pro25 Penwag Property Co. v. Landau, 148 N.J. Super. 493, 500, 372 A.2d 1162,
1165 (App. Div. 1977) (citing Mayflower Ind. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139,
151-52, 83 A.2d 246, 251-52 (Ch. Div. 1951), aff'd, 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952)),
aff'd, 76 N.J. 595, 388 A.2d 1265 (1978).
26 Evans, 233 N.J. Super. at 662, 559 A.2d at 893. The Evans court recognized
that the analogous elements under the Frivolous Lawsuit Statute are:
(1) the assertion by another party was frivolous, which can be established under section B of the statute by a finding by the judge that either
(a) the underlying claim 'was commenced, used or continued in bad
faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury' or
(b) the nonprevailing party knew or should have known that the claim
had no reasonable or equitable basis nor could it be supported by a
good faith argument for a change in the law; (2) the claim is being asserted by a prevailing party in a civil action; and (3) the prevailing party
had to expend or have been committed to pay for litigation costs and
attorney fees.
Id. at 660, 559 A.2d at 892 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1 (West Supp.
1989)).
27 Id. at 661, 559 A.2d at 893.
28 Fieldler Agency v. Eldan Constr. Corp., 152 N.J. Super. 344, 348, 377 A.2d
1220, 1222 (Law Div. 1977).
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cess, providing a legal "safety net" to catch frivolous acts in the
course of litigation that might otherwise slip through unredressed.
II.

DEFENSES TO A FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT STATUTE CLAIM

Because the Statute is so recent, a substa'ntial body of case
law, defining its parameters and defenses, has yet to be developed. The similarities between the language of the Statute and
that of Rule 11,29 however, offer the practitioner some guidance.
Many of the defenses which follow, with the notable exception of
the Statute's possible unconstitutionality, are based upon the
federal case law that has developed under Rule 11.
A.

Constitutionality

Surprisingly, there has been no challenge to the Statute's
constitutionality. The New Jersey Constitution empowers the
New Jersey Supreme Court, not the legislature, to promulgate
rules governing the practice and procedure in all state courts,
and provides it with jurisdiction over "the discipline of persons
admitted" to the practice of law.3 ° However, no court has yet
determined whether the legislature's passage of the Statute violates either of these mandates. The possibility looms that the
Statute might ultimately be struck down as an unconstitutional
encroachment by the legislative branch upon the power and au29 Rule 11 provides in part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion,
or other paper and state the party's address ....
The signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in tie
cost of litigation ....
If a pleading, motion, or otlhr paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative,
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the
other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This language is very similar to that of the Statute. See supra
note 6 and accompanying text.
30 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3.
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thority of thejudiciary. Indeed, from the enactment of the modern version of the New Jersey Constitution to the present day,
the state's highest court has struck down legislation that far more
obliquely encroached on this power:"
In 1921, Justice Cardozo expressed his concern that "[the
legislature, informed only casually and intermittently of the
needs and problems of the courts, without expert or responsible
or disinterested or systematic advice as to the workings of one
rule or another, patches the fabric here and there, and mars often
what it would mend.""2 The legislative history of the 1947 revision of the New Jersey Constitution clearly reflected Justice Cardozo's concern. 3 The provision stated that "[t]he Supreme Court
shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the
State and subject to law, the practice andprocedure in all such courts.
The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to
34
the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted."
In the seminal case of Winberry v. Salisbury,3 5 the first sentence of that constitutional provision was interpreted as vesting
in the supreme court the exclusive power, to regulate the practice
and procedure of the courts.3" This exclusive power, the court
pointed out, did not extend to substantive law, the passage of
which is the very heart of the legislature's function. The phrase
"subject to law," according to the court, "serves as a continuous
reminder that the rule-making power as to practice and procedure must not invade the field of the substantive law as such ...
[The courts] are not to make substantive law wholesale through
the exercise of the rule-making power."3 7
See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REv. 113, 113-14 (1921). See also
Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 32 (1952)
(quoting Cardozo as describing the matter succinctly and convincingly).
33 See Kaplan and Greene, The Legislatures"Relation to Judicial Rulemaking: An Appraisalof JWinbern v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234, 241-45 (1951).
34 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3 (emphasis added).
35 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950). In IVinbeiry, the court
was confronted with a conflict between the court rules which provided 45 days for
an appeal from a final judgment, and the analogous statutory provision which provided for a one-year time limit. The court held that the court rules controlled because this was a matter of "practice and procedure" exclusively reserved for the
supreme court under the then newly-revised New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 243,
74 A.2d at 408.
36 Id. at 255, 74 A.2d at 415. Specifically, the court concluded "that the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court is not subject to overriding legislation ....
[It] is confined to practice, procedure and administration as such." Id. See Knight v.
Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 389, 431 A.2d 833, 840 (1981).
37 Winbe-y, 5 N.J. at 248, 74 A.2d at 410. Cf.Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 36131
32
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NewJersey courts have determined that the award of counsel
fees is a matter of procedure, not substantive law. 8 Moreover,
this matter of procedure has been exhaustively regulated by the
supreme court. For instance, New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9 enumerates many
situations in which an award of counsel fees may
be allowed. 319 Included in Rule 4:42-9 are actions in family law,
probate, foreclosure, and insurance liability or indemnity actions. 41 Counsel fees may also be paid out of a fund in court, or
as expressly provided in the court rules, or "where counsel fees
are permitted by statute.' '41
Although sanctions for institution of frivolous litigation are
not specified, the rule's "permitted by statute" language effectively subsumes all counsel-fee statutes as one of the categories
allowed. Without that wording, every counsel-fee statute, being
a matter of "procedure," would be constitutionally infirm unless
it provided for those fees under circumstances which were also
authorized under the court rules.4" Thus, it appears that the
Statute does not violate the constitutional mandate that the
supreme court have exclusive jurisdiction over the practice and
procedure in the courts because the court rules expressly authorize counsel fees where "permitted by statute."
This however, does not resolve the question of whether the
Statute is constitutional. The same constitutional provision contains a second sentence which provides that "[t]he supreme court
shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law
and the discipline of persons admitted." ' 4 3 Thus, the question
arises as to whether the Statute encroaches upon the area of attorney discipline.
It certainly purports to regulate activity which is already proscribed by the Rules of Professional Conduct which provide:
63, 307 A.2d 571, 576-77, appealdismissed, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973) (matters of practice
and procedure may nevertheless evolve from case law); New Jersey Dist. Court Assoc. v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 205 N.J. Super. 582, 587, 501 A.2d 596, 598-99
(Law Div. 1985), afftd, 208 N.J. Super. 527, 506 A.2d 742 (App. Div. 1986), certif.
denied, 104 N.J. 386, 517 A.2d 393 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987) (procedural rules may impact upon substantive rights).
38 State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 12, 95 A.2d 715, 726-27 (1953); Cohen v.
Fair Lawn Dairies, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 206, 210, 206 A.2d 585, 587 (App. Div.),
aff'd, 44 N.J. 450, 210 A.2d 73 (1965).
39 N.J. CT. R. 4:42-9.
40 Id. See also supra note 15 listing the situations where counsel fees may be
awarded.
41 N.J. CT. R. 4:42-9(a)(8).
42 Otis, 12 N.J. at 9-10, 95 A.2d at 718-19.
43 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3.
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A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, nor assert or
controvert an issue therein unless the lawyer knows or reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.4 4
This language is very similar to the Statute's allowance of counsel
fees and costs for a frivolous claim or defense. The Statute
prohibits:
[A claim or defense] commenced, used or continued in bad
faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious
injury; or . . . [which] [t]he nonprevailing party knew, or

should have known.., was without any reasonable basis in law
or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law. 4 5
Assuming that the Statute does regulate the discipline of attorneys,
the obvious question is whether the supreme court has allowed the
legislature to encroach on this area in the same manner as it has in
the "procedure" of awarding counsel fees.
That question was answered in the negative by In re Hearing on
Immunity for Ethics Complainants.46 That case addressed the issue of
whether an attorney could sue a client for malicious prosecution in
response to a claim by the client against the attorney before the ethics or fee arbitration committees.
The New Jersey Supreme Court had previously decided this issue in Toft v. Ketchum. 4 7 In Toft, the court held "that the filing of a
complaint with an ethics and grievance committee is privileged and
that an attorney cannot predicate a malicious prosecution or similar
suit upon it."' 48

Within a year the legislature responded to Toft by

passing title 2A, section 47A-1 of the NewJersey Statutes which "allow[ed] a malicious prosecution action to be brought against the
complainant by an attorney who is the subject of an ethics
complaint."

49

In 1982, the supreme court appointed a committee to study the
disciplinary structure of the courts. ° In 1984, upon the commitN.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1.
45 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1(b)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1989).
44

47

96 N.J. 669, 477 A.2d 339 (1984).
18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671, cerl. denied, 350 U.S. 887 (1955).

48

Id. at 287, 113 A.2d at 675.

46

In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 672, 477
A.2d 339, 340 (1984).
49.
50

Id.
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tee's recommendation, the supreme court adopted Rule 1:20-11 (b)
which stated, in part:
Grievants in ethics matters and clients in fee arbitration cases
shall be absolutely immune from suit, whether legal or equitable in nature, for all communications to Committees, Fee
Committees, the Director, the Board, or to appropriate staff
and for testimony given in ethics or fee arbitration
proceedings.5'
The rule was subsequently amended to extend the immunity to
"witnesses in both ethics and fee matters. "52
In order to resolve the conflict between the rule and title 2A,
section 47A-1 of the New Jersey Statutes, the supreme court issued
the opinion in In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants in lieu

of an official commentary to the rule. 5 3 Finding that this provision
was invalid because it encroached upon the supreme court's exclusive power to regulate the discipline of attorneys, the court stated:
This Court simply cannot in the least abdicate its responsibility to exercise exclusive power over the disciplining of attorneys .... This is a matter committed solely to us by the Constitution.
Whether the legislative intrusion isminimal or important is, it seems to
us, irrelevant. . . . We are fully and exclusively responsible for that
subject.54

Thus, the power to discipline attorneys, unlike the power to regulate the practice and procedure in the courts as it relates to awarding
counsel fees, is an area in which 55the supreme court will simply not
tolerate legislative impingement.
Consequently, if the supreme court were to be confronted with
the question of the Statute's constitutionality, the power to disci51

Id. at 671, 477 A.2d at 340.

52 N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11(b).
53 In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. at 671, 477 A.2d at 340.
54 Id. at 678, 477 A.2d at 344 (emphasis added). See also American Trial Lawyers
v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 66 N.J. 258, 262-64, 330 A.2d 350, 352-53 (1974)
(noting that the supreme court has " 'legislatively' adopted Rules of general application regulating the professional conduct of attorneys and their relationships to
their clients and to the courts").
55 N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8 states that an attorney's signature on a pleading constitutes
his certification that "there is good ground to support it; that it does not contain
scandalous or indecent matter; and that it is not interposed for delay." It provides
that the sanction for a wilful violation of the Rule is either a disciplinary action
against the attorney or a contempt proceeding against a party pro se.
In Bethelsen v. Hall, 194 N.J. Super. 22, 475 A.2d 1275 (App. Div. 1984), the
court stated "that until R. 1:4-8 is amended or other specific authority is given for
the general imposition of sanctions . . .the procedural formalities of a contempt
proceeding or a reference to a disciplinarypanel should be followed." Id. at 26, 27,
475 A.2d at 1278 (emphasis added).
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pline attorneys, not the power to regulate the practice and procedure of the courts, would most likely be the focus of the argument in
contesting the Statute's constitutionality. Indeed, in Evans v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance,5 6 the court commented:
While it may be argued that allowing a sanction for the assertion of a frivolous position is exclusively within the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under N.J. Const. (1947), Art.
6, Sec. 2, par. 3, and its interpretation in Winberry v. Salisbury,
that issue has not been addressed by the parties and, accordingly, this court shall not rule on that question.
Undoubtedly, as the Statute is increasingly employed by litigants,
this issue will be addressed by the parties and the judiciary will be
forced to settle the question.5 8
B.

Timing of the Motion

Although neither the Statute nor Rule 11 truly addresses the
timing of a motion for sanctions, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the supervisory rule that a motion should be
brought "as soon as practicable after discovery of the Rule 11
violation" and, in any event, "before the entry of final judgment. 15 9 The public policy behind this requirement is two-fold:
"Promptness in filing valid motions will serve not only to foster
efficiency, but in many instances will deter further violations of
Rule 11 which might otherwise occur during the remainder of the
litigation. "60
In his seminal article on Rule 11, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule Il -A Closer Look, 6 Judge William W. Schwarzer of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California set forth two additional reasons for requiring expeditious filing of Rule 11 motions. First, a timely filing may reduce the
appearance that hindsight was relied upon in the imposition of
sanctions.1 2 Second, delay in filing the motion "undermines the
233 N.J. Super. 652, 559 A.2d 888 (Law Div. 1989).
One solution would be for the supreme court to amend N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8 so
that it mirrors the Statute.
58 Evans, 233 N.J. Super. at 658 n.1, 559 A.2d at 891 (citations omitted).
59 Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle. 847 F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1988). See also In
re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1986). amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 450 (1987) (where papers are obviously frivolous
court should immediately notify attorney that sanctions may be imposed at conclusion of trial).
60 Pensiero, 847 F.2d at 99 (citing Schwarzer, supra note 22, at 194-95).
56

57

" Schwarzer, supra note 22, at 181.
62

Id. at 197-98.
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mitigation principle which should apply in the imposition of
sanctions, limiting recovery to those expenses and fees that were
reasonably necessary to resist the offending paper."" Both of
these reasons would presumably apply with equal force to the
institution of a motion under the Statute. If litigation costs and
attorney fees are intended to be the compensation for the victim
of a claim or defense interposed in bad faith, that victim should
not be allowed to increase counsel fees and costs by delaying the
motion while continuing to litigate.
As noted in Evans, early adjudication promotes the goal of
discouraging frivolous positions. Early determination may also
force a litigant to realize a potentially weak position and encourage settlement discussions. 64 Although this may not necessarily provide a complete defense under the Statute, it may prove
an effective method of encouraging early settlement and reducing the award.
Furthermore, to the extent that a party was fully prepared to
bring a motion to dismiss his adversary's frivolous claim, but unreasonably delayed doing so, the nonprevailing party may argue
that a portion of the fees should be barred as having been needlessly and wastefully incurred. Of course, a party who has just
been found to have asserted a frivolous claim is not in a particularly strong position to argue that an adversary should have been
more expeditious in seeking to dismiss his frivolous claim. Nevertheless, it may be appropriate to take discovery to determine
whether there was a bad faith motive in delaying the motion.
C.

Reliance on Client-Supplied Information

Rule 11 does not require that an attorney be held strictly
liable whenever inaccurate factual information forms the basis of
a frivolous claim or defense.6 5 Unlike issues of law, issues of fact
are,perforce, issues. Rule 11 stresses the need for reasonable prefiling inquiry into both the factual assertions of the action and its
legal foundation. The standard, according to the courts, "is one
Id. at 198.
Evans v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins., 233 N.J. Super. 652, 659, 559
A.2d 888, 892 (Law Div. 1989). The court noted the "longstanding policy of the
law to encourage settlements which would then terminate litigation." Id.
65 Report, supra note 4, at xx. The Third Circuit Task Force stressed that a court
should not use hindsight to test the signer's conduct under Rule 11. Id. Such conduct by the court would "chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing
factual or legal theories." Id.
63
64
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of reasonableness under the circumstances." 66
Of course, the defense of reliance upon information supplied by another works both ways. A client could just as easily
assert that it was reasonable to rely on the attorney's review of
the law or the attorney's investigation of the facts. Once again,
the key to this defense for the attorney or the client is the reasonableness of such reliance under the circumstances.
D.

Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine

According to the notes of the Advisory Committee, Rule 11
"does not require a party or an attorney to disclose privileged
communications or work product in order to show that the signing of the pleading, motion, or other paper is substantially

justified. "67
Judge Schwarzer, however, has questioned whether this is
truly an obstacle to the application of Rule 11. He argued that
courts should be skeptical when an attorney asserts the privilege, 68 stating: "If the information received from the client is relevant to whether a paper is well-founded, it probably must
eventually be disclosed in any event, either in a pleading or in
discovery; that it may have been incorporated in work product
does not immunize it from disclosure."' 69 In deciding whether an
attorney should be allowed to invoke the privilege, a judge may
conduct an in camera examination of the material. 70 Such an examination, however, should not be used extensively because of
the implication that an ex parte communication might have on the
merits of the case.
Moreover, the empirical study recently conducted by the
Third Circuit Task Force found "a paucity of complaints and
66 Id. In determining whether sanctions should be imposed, the Third Circuit
Task Force noted that:
[W]hat constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as
how much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he
had to rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the
pleading, motion, or other paper; whether the pleading, motion, or
other paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he
depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar.
Id.
67 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Advisory Committee's Note to 1983 Amendment of Rule
I1).
68 Schwarzer, supra note 22, at 199.
69 Id.
70 Id. See also Report, supra note 4, at xx (noting that Rule 11 does not require an
attorney or a party to disclose privileged communications to show that the pleading
is substantially justified).
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comments""1 from attorneys regarding this issue. The study suggested that the assertion of the privilege has little practical impact. One reason which the Third Circuit Task Force has
ascribed for the lack of assertion of the privilege is that attorneys
"probably recognize that, in responding.to allegations of professional abuse, they are permitted to reveal information, including
confidential information, relating to the representation.' '72
Regardless of its lack of acceptance among commentators,
the utility of this defense will depend, once again, on the circumstances of the particular case. A court must, therefore, determine
whether the nonmoving party is truly deprived of the ability to
mount a defense because divulgence of trial strategy or privileged communications would result.
E. Ability to Pay
Unlike the normal measure of damages, in assessing Rule 11
sanctions the "impact on the person against whom they are assessed must ... be considered and [the] ability to pay" should be
"a factor in determining reasonableness. ' ' 7 3
Recently, in Doering v. Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders,7 4 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals expressly held that the
sanctioned party's ability to pay should be a "particularly relevant equitable factor ' 75 in the calculation of Rule 11 sanctions.
This is so because "the deterrent effect of an award of attorney's
fees depends on the extent of the sanctioned party's
resources." 76
This mitigating factor may be even more significant in a motion under the Statute. Unlike Rule 11, the Statute states that in
determining an appropriate sanction, the court must consider
"any other factors relevant in evaluating fees and costs." ' 77 Thus,
it may be argued that the language should be interpreted expansively so as to include the nonmoving party's ability to pay.
Report, supra, note 4, at 87.
Id.
73 Schwarzer, supra note 22, at 203 (citing Colucci v. New York Times Co., 533
F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
74 857 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1988).
75 Id. at 195.
76 Id. at 195-96.
77 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1(c)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
71
72
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Recovery of Punitive Damages

Evans v. PrudentialProperty and Causualty Insurance7" stands for
the proposition that a claim under the Statute must be brought
by motion rather than counterclaim because "[i]t can be filed in a
timely and not premature manner, immediately following the establishment of the movant as a prevailing party." 7 9 Normally,
punitive damages are only available pursuant to a prayer for such
relief in the pleadings. Because the Evans court has stated that
the Statute may not be employed as a cause of action, but only as
a motion, that in itself might present a "procedural" defense to
the recovery of punitive damages under the Statute, or at least
force the court awarding such damages to create a new procedural framework.
Evans, however, was a trial level determination. A different
court, perhaps a higher court, might find that a claim under the
Statute may be brought by counterclaim. In such a case a party
might very well seek to include punitive damages in its ad damnum
clause because asserting a frivolous claim or defense could constitute the level of wilful, wanton, and reckless behavior necessary for an award of punitive damages.8 0
The defense to such relief, however, would lie in the plain
language of the Statute. As noted in Evans, "[t]he statute specifies that the award may be for 'all reasonable litigation costs and
reasonable attorney fees.' This excludes any other type of relief."' Thus, unless future case law holds to the contrary, it appears that a litigant would have a complete defense to a motion
for punitive damages under the Statute. 2
G.

Recovery by a NonprevailingParty

Curiously, the Statute does not define the term "prevailing
party," although only a prevailing party may make a claim under
it. In light of the conclusion in Evans that the court has a great
deal of latitude in determining whether the "particular circumstances" of the case should result in an award of counsel fees and
costs," it would seem to follow that a prevailing party is not al78 233 N.J. Super. 652, 559 A.2d 888 (Law Div. 1989).
79 Id. at 664, 559 A.2d at 894.
80 Sandler v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Corp., 141 N.J. Super. 437, 448
(App. Div.), 358 A.2d 805, 811, certif denied, 71 N.J. 503, 366 A.2d 658 (1976).
81 Evans, 233 N.J. Super. at 663, 559 A.2d at 894.
82 See id. The Evans court specifically rejected the argument that punitive damages were available under the Statute. Id., 559 A.2d at 894.
83 Id. at 665, 559 A.2d at 895. The court stated that the legislature, in using the
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ways the one who wins a trial on the merits. In fact, the Evans
court asserted that a logical reading of the Statute supports the
notion that a party could be characterized as prevailing at any
84
point during the litigation.
The first section of the Statute provides that a judge may
find an asserted claim frivolous "at any time during the proceedings." '8 5 This language, standing alone, indicates that it was the
legislature's intent that a party may prevail on a particular claim
during the litigation and at that time bring a motion under the
Statute. This section begins, however, with the phrase "[a] party
who prevails in a civil action." 8 6 This language could imply that a
prevailing party is one who has been issued a favorable determination disposing of the entire lawsuit as it applies to him. The
Evans court, though not adhering to that conclusion, noted that
"a reasonable and grammatical reading" of the Statute could indeed support the contention that a party might only be considered to be prevailing after disposition of the suit at the trial
87
level.
Because courts constantly grant or deny relief to litigants
without prejudice, it is quite difficult to ascertain whether a party
is in fact a prevailing party. One common example is a summary
judgment motion found by the court to have been brought
precipitously because discovery had not been completed. Did
the nonmoving party prevail? Because the substance of the motion was not reached, perhaps he did not prevail. On the other
hand, the nonmoving party may argue that bringing a motion
precipitously is a frivolous act and that the denial of the motion,
even without prejudice, sufficiently established that the moving
party did not prevail.
This issue was addressed in the second case to construe the
language "may award damages," intended that judicial discretion be used in deciding sanctions. Id. (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 658-59, 559 A.2d at 891-92.
85 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1(a) (West Supp. 1989).
86 Id.
87 Evans, 233 N.J. Super. at 658-59, 559 A.2d at 891-92. The court in Evans
noted:
The statute does not indicate precisely when one has attained the status
of being a prevailing party. Logically, on the one hand, that status could
be achieved when one prevails on a particular claim during the progress
of the litigation or, on the other hand, it could be when one has ultimately prevailed at the trial level after the return of a verdict. A reasonable and grammatical reading of the statute would support either
alternative.
Id. at 658, 559 A.2d at 891.
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Statute, Iannone v. McHale.8 8 In Iannone, the court held that a
party who voluntarily withdrew a claim under the New Jersey
Election Law could be assessed costs and attorney fees under the
Frivolous Lawsuit Statute. The court held that the fact that the
withdrawal was voluntary did not preclude a finding that the defendants had been prevailing parties as required by the Statute
because:
To say these defendants did not prevail is misleading. The
petition was withdrawn and the election results remain as confirmed. A "settlement" was reached in which these defendants
played no part .... These defendants were ready to proceed
on the hearing date. If a plaintiff petitioner withdraws his petition complaint without taking any action against a defendant
respondent that defendant is a prevailing party ....89
At this writing, Iannone is on appeal before the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. It remains to be seen if the
higher court will shed further light on this issue. Until that time
there simply is no bright line test for determining who will be considered prevailing parties under the Statute.
H.

Due Process

The Statute sets forth clear requirements which afford the
nonmoving party certain due process protections. The judge is
required to make his finding based upon "the pleadings, discovery, or the evidence presented." 9 Further, the application must
be made to the court with a supporting affidavit which meets the
detailed requirements set forth in the Statute. 9 ' Of course, if adequate due process was not afforded, the award would not only
be assailable under the Statute, but also as a violation of both the
United States and New Jersey Constitutions.9 2
III.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, the list of defenses set forth in this article is not exhaustive. The judiciary however, will most probably address the
above enumerated defenses in the coming years and develop an
instructive body of case law to assist practitioners. The ostensi88 236 NJ. Super. 227, 565 A.2d 422 (Law Div. 1989); see also 124 NJ.LJ. 1209
(Nov. 9, 1989).
89 lannone v. McHale, No. CPM-L-452-89PW, slip op. at 3-4 (Law Div. decided
July 31, 1989).
90 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1(b) (West Supp. 1989).
9' Id. at § 2A:15-59.1(c) (West Supp. 1989).
92 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1, 5.
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ble purposes of the Statute, to deter frivolous claims and compensate victims, is a laudable one. It remains to be seen
however, whether the various statutory infirmities and open issues identified in this article will serve to create more litigation
than they deter.

